This analysis tries to answer two questions: First, how did Germany, a country of de facto immigration, manage to espouse a counterfactual ideology in the 1980s and early 1990s? Second, what have been the political consequences of upholding a political discourse that denied the reality of immigration? In a polity that officially denies migration and the emergence of a multiethnic society, issues such as immigration regulation and the settlement of labor mi grants have not been directly addressed in partisan discourse. An ethno-cultural conception of citizenship eased a politics of exclusion of "guestworkers" from but inclusion of ethnic Germans in voting rights and aredefinition of refugee flows as labor migration. This development reinforced the symbolic uses of politics by political parties and politicians: Immigration, asylum and the multiethnic polity came to be meta-issues that could be referred to as causes of manifold problems in a context of rising unemployment and a "crisis of the welfare state." Even the main alternative to the dominant partisan discourse -"multiculturalism" -has remained a mirror image of an ethno-cultural conception of membership by advocating a similarly one-dimensional image of cultural autonomy of ethnic groups in multiethnic states and excluding issues of socioeconomic and political participation.
1.

Introduction: The Paradox of De Facto Immigration and the Ideology of a Non-Immigration Country
5
Between 1945 and 1989 net immigration into the old Federal Republic of Germany amounted to more than eighteen million people. During the same period about sixteen million immigrated into the United States, one of the classical countries of immigration. If we take the proportion of immigrants as a percentage of the total population, it is higher in Germany than in the United States (cf. Statistisches Bundesamt; PassellEdmonston 1992). In the German case immigrants include expellees and refugees from Eastem Europe (ethnic Germans), labor mi grants from the Mediterranean ("guestworkers") and refugees that entered through the asylum process; in the American case all those are counted who entered legally as immigrants. Thus, it is remarkable that the government of the Federal Republic has clung to the idea that Germany is not a country of immigration (Deutsches Ausländerrecht 1993: 167) . There has been no public discourse on immigration regulation. Instead of immigration, conflicts over the constitutional right to political asylum have occupied center stage. Thus, we are left to explain a political paradox: How did a country of de facto immigration manage to espouse a counterfactual ideology in the In a polity that officially denies the reality of migration, issues that arise from the settlement of labor mi grants, e.g. , citizenship rights, and immigration regulation have not been directly addressed. Instead, migration and integration figured prominently in the politics concerning unemployment and cutbacks in the welfare state. In this situation political parties try to define the terms and images that serve above all tactical purposes in inter-party competition. Those political parties that are successful in defining issues have more chances of succeeding in the electoral arena. Political actors are not only or primarily interested in solving issues and problems that arise from policies: they also strive to originate events. Conflict between the major actors in the German political system, political parties, can thus be seen as a discourse in symbolic politics (Edel man 1964) . Symbolic politics uses substitutes to address substantive policy problems.
In Germany, as in all other West European countries, immigration has moved from "Iow politics" to "high politics", as immigration came to be a highly politicized issue during the 1980s. For German political parties the symbolic politics of immigration and integration may have been attractive for at least two reasons. Symbolic politics that promoted the return of "guestworkers" to their countries of origin in the early 1980s offered a way to avoid discussions over citizenship rights of settled labor migrants. And the inter-party conflicts that resulted in restrictions placed upon the right to political asylum in the early 1990s allowed political actors to bypass fundamental questions of immigration control and distribution al conflicts in the welfare state.
First, immigration of "guestworkers" and ethnic Germans raises issues of political membership.
Those political parties interested in incorporating ethnic Germans (CDU, Christlich
Demokratische Union and CSU, Christlich Soziale Union) tried to cast membership in cultural terms, engaging in the symbolie politics of the "foreigners' problem" (Ausländerproblem). The CDU and CSU pursued policies that centered upon "assimilation" of "guestworkers" to German society, or their "return" to the sending eountries. In 1983, the Gerrnan government implemented a short-Iived return policy. This poliey effort was symbolic. Based on earlier Freneh efforts it could be predicted that only few labor migrants would return to the country of origin after having settled in Germany. This "assimilation" vs. "return" strategy also impeded efforts of the social democrats (SPD, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands), interested in including settled labor migrants into the electorate.
Seeond, immigration raises issues of admission to the territory of the national state. In particular, problems of transnational border control became apparent after the fall of the "iron curtain" and the "wall." The rapid increase in the number of immigrants in the late 1980s and early 1990s --ethnie Germans and asylum seekers --called into quest ion the ability of the federal government to control Germany's borders and regulate immigration (See Table I ). During the I 980s, administrative efforts to greatly restrict the right to asylum had not substantially altered the number of refugees entering Germany. The high number of refugees may have even been in part an unintended consequence of de facto immigration policies. To apply for political asylum was for many migrants the only way of entering one of the richest eountries in the world. Eventually, in 1992, the major political parties settled on a compromise to change the constituional right to political asylum. Even though the latest changes in the constitution may result in a decline of asylum seekers, other migratory flows could increase, for example unauthorized migration. Thus, although various policies have curbed the admission of particular groups, it is hard to see how, short of rigorous border control through poliee-state methods, Germany can substantially decrease the total number of immigrants, especially c1andestine population movements.
Symbolic politics meant that immigration gained the status of a meta-issue (LasweIl 1948) . Immigration and asylum could be referred to as a cause of manifold problems. For conservative parties and the emerging right-wing populist Republikaner the sy mbolic politics of asylum was appealing because certain groups of immigrants and asylum seekers could easily be connected to a host of domestic issues. For example, distributional struggles over social goods during the periods of relatively high unemployment since the laIe I 970s and after German unification in 1990 made it easier for politieians to refer to immigrants as eompetitors in the eeonomie realm. Conservative and populist groups have also emphasized the threat of immigrants to the alleged ethnic homogeneity of the German national state. 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Admission of Asyllim Seekers and Ethnic Germans (1980-1992) Note: The number of refugees applying for political asylum f1uctuated between 4,000 and 9,000 in the mid-1970s.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 1992: 91; and BMAS 1993: 13.
The symbolic uses of politics regarding immigration can be found in all West European countries. Since the late 1970s, political discourse in Western welfare states has been full of references to immigrants as economic competitors and as unwilling to assimilate culturally. Also, the gradual restrictions placed upon immigration and political asylum have not been a peculiar feature of German policy. Indeed, the emergence of restrictive policies has been the hall mark of politics in all West European and North American nation-states since the early 1 970s. Increased xenophobia has not been a peculiarly German phenomenon, either. For example, in 1991 , more violent attacks against immigrants were recorded in Great Britain than in Germany (Thränhardt 1993) .
The specificity of the German situation has been that the legally defined ethno-cultural understanding of citizenship has eased the symbolic use of immigration in political conflicts. The fiction of a country of non-immigration could only be upheld by a political discourse of symbolic politics that defined membership exciusively in ethno-cultural terms. The German polity at once demands that immigrants assimilate culturally and, at the same time, denies the opportunity for cultural integration and political participation through an ethnic understanding of membership. This understanding is codified in German citizenship law, the Reichs-und Staatsangehärigkeitsgesetz that dates back to 1913. This law is explicitly based upon an ethnic concept of membership that defines belonging to a polity in cultural terms, i.e., language, customs, and ancestry. These exclusionary efforts appealed to the ethnic solidarity of the native population.
Beginning with the writings of Friedrich Meinecke (190911970) and Hans Kohn (1944 Kohn ( /1967 , this ethno-cultural principle has been contrasted to a republican principle that grounds membership in a polity in political participation instead of cultural assimilation. In Europe, these writers claimed, France comes closest to this type. Yet, these two different versions of national identity -ethno-cultural vs. republican, Eastern vs. Western nationalism -can be found to varying degrees in all Western national states, and are not exclusively limited to either Eastern or Western vers ions of nationalism and citizenship. Whereas this earlier literature has referred to ethno-cultural and republican concepts of citizenship as real types that can be found in specific countries (e.g., Brubaker 1992) , this analysis uses these notions as principles that guide empirical analysis. Given the dynamics of party competition in the Federal Republic of Germany, the CDU and CSU had incentives to vigorously support the ethno-cultural concept of citizenship, while the SPD found it advantageous to take steps towards the republican principle.
Three main groups of immigrants and asylum seekers have played different roles in the calculus of political party strategists (Table 2) . First, a settled immigrant population, mainly "guestworkers" from southern and southeastern Europe emerged in the course of the labor migrant recruitment and settlement, accompanied by family reunification . Second, due to the constitutionally guaranteed right to asylum, refugees from Eastern Europe and developing countries have applied for political asylum in the Federal Republic . Third, special provisions have brought refugees (Flüchtlinge) and expellees (Vertriebene) from Eastern Europe in the 1940s and 1950s to the Federal Republic. Based on legislation passed in the 1950s, large numbers of ethnic Germans (Aussiedler) could come to Germany in the late 1980s and early I 990s after the opening of borders in eastern Europe.
The analysis covers the period from the late 1970s until the early 1990s. In the late I 970s issues of migration and integration came to occupy partisan discourse for the first time when the number of asylum seekers rose above 100,000 and the settlement of "guestworkers" became obvious in the process of family reunification.
The first section deals with symbolic politics and the ethno-cultural understanding of membership and political citizenship. It is about conflicts over immigrants as bearers of political rights. In the second section the analysis focusses on how immigration came to be a meta-issue in aperiod of economic recession and the "crisis of the welfare state." It discusses "welfare chauvinism," i.e., the role of symbolic politics in the debate over social rights of immigrants and asylum seekers. The third section analyzes the consequences of symbolic politics for the general political discourse on immigration and examines the dominant alternative to the ethno-cultural concept of membership in German political discourse, multiculturalism. There are other groups of labor migrants in Germany, for example, contract workers (Werkvertragsarbeitnehmer). However, until 1992, public discussion focused exclusively on those labor mi grants that were hired until the recruitment stop in 1973.
Symbolic Politics and Political Citizenship: Voting Rights for Labor Migrants and Ethnic Germans
The sy mbolie polities of immigration prohibited a debate over politieal partieipation of immigrants in the German polity and emphasized eultural assimilation. Nevertheless, labor migrants and ethnie Germans have played important roles as potential eleetoral support groups for the CDU/CSU and the SPD. However, while the CDU/CSU sueeessfully ineorporated ethnie Germans as voters, the SPD failed to include settled labor migrants. Based on an ethnie understanding of membership in the German polity settled labor migrants were denied politieal rights, while the very same prineiple served to legitimize politieal inclusion of ethnie Germans from Eastern Europe. Due to different interests parti san diseourse pitted "guestworkers" against ethnie Germans.
Extrapolation from historieal evidenee and publie opinion polis suggest that "guestworkers" would eonstitute a prime eleetoral clientele for the SPD. Blue-eollar workers have formed a classieal support group of soeial demoeraey in Germany. In the 1980s up to twenty pereent of the blue-eollar working class in major industrial areas were labor migrants (e.g., in the Ruhr metropolitan region) . If settled aliens had the right to vote in loeal eleetions, the magnitude of change would be eonsiderable: In Frankfurt, the city with the highest proportion of immigrants in the Federal Republie (more than 20 percent), voting rights for settled foreigners would inerease the populaee by more than 15 percent (Koeh-Arzberger 1992).
The major unantieipated effeet of labor migrant poliey has been the e mergenee of a multiethnie soeiety in the Federal Republie during the last three and a half deeades . In the late 1970s, SPD politieians began to publicly emphasize pOlieies to funher integrate the "guestworker" population that had co me to settle in Germany. Gastarbeiter reeruitment poliey was an aetive poliey of the German federal state, earried out by the Federal Employment Ageney. Until the mid-1970s polieymakers in federal government were able to cast labor migration in exclusively eeonomie terms. When a substantial part of the "guestworker" population stayed on and did not return to the eountry of origin, and a seeond and third generation of foreigners grew up in Germany, ineremental policy ehanges oecurred . The originally dominant Ministry of Labor began to share responsibilities with the federal Ministry of Interior and its counterpart in the states.
At this time, the Kühn Memorandum (1979) proposed policies to address both socio-eeonomie problems of settlement (e.g., integration of seeond-generation immigrants in schools and labor markets) and naturalization, a move from ius sanguinis to ius soli. Heinz Kühn (SPD), a former prime minister of Northrhine-Westphalia and the first federal ombudsperson for foreigner's affairs, recommended active polieies of anti-diserimination in the workplaee, schools, housing and soeial services. Groups within the SPD suggested a "right to settlement" (Niederlassungs recht) , a poliey suggestion that avoided any referenee to eitizenship.1
However, in a political climate, in which the asylum issue played an important role in electoral campaigns (1980), the proposals with respect to political fights were not implemented . Nevertheless, some of the changes brought about by new "Aliens' Law" (1990) finally eased the process of Many of the proposals of the Kühn Memorandum found their way into SPD campaign platforms in 1980. In particular, the SPD committed itself to grant local voting rights to settled immigrants. Nonetheless, the SPD was careful not to play into the hands of CDU/CSU campaigns that seized upon the issues of voting rights and asylum for campaign purposes. SPD chancellor Helmut Schmidt took great care to avoid the issue of election rights for foreigners , fearing that this would advantage the CDU/CSU candidate for chancellor in 1980, Franz-Josef Strauß (CSU). The CDU and CSU party leadership kept a low profile and accused the SPDIFDP government of not handling problems of asylum and foreign workers weil . Less prominent CDU/CSU politicians went further to dramatize the issue, introducing terms such as "overflooding", "too many foreigners", and "abuse of asylum" (Thränhardt 1984 ).
In the late I 970s, when the settlement of "guestworkers" became more and more obvious, both the CDU and the CSU framed the integration of labor migrants as the "foreigners' problem" (Ausländerproblem). The CDU and CSU emphasized the Ausländerproblem in their return to power on the federal level in 1982/83. In his first governmental declaration in the Fall of 1982, Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU) declared "foreigners' policy" to be one out of the four most urgent issues to be addressed in his emergency program. Speaking to steelworkers in Dortmund, Kohl declared that he intended to reduce the number of foreigners in Germany by about one million. ModelIed on the French example, the new CDU/CSU-FDP government gave financial incentives for "guestworkers" to return to their countries of origin (1983/84). Few returned . Moreover, the government set up a commission to study the "foreigners' problem." Nothing happened. In his second governmental address in the spring of 1983, Kohl did not even mention the "foreigners' problem." The symbolic uses of this strategy was obvious: There was not much difference between the actual policies the Social DemocraticlLiberal federal government (SPD and FDP) pursued until 1982, and the succeeding Christian-DemocraticlLiberal coalition government (Meier-Braun 1988) .
While this symbolic use of politics may have paid off for the CDU in competing with the SPD for votes in the 1980 and 1983 elections, its success in addressing the challenge of right-wing populist parties turned out to be much more ambiguous. Conflicts over immigration were connected to structural changes in the post-war German party system. Three political groups have been integrated within the CDU: The economic liberals have organized in the Wirtschaftsausschüsse (interests of entrepreneurs), Catholic and Protestant labor in the Sozialausschüsse (interests of unions and churches); and national-conservatives were weil represented in the Bavarian CSU. For a long time this setup constituted the hall mark of the CDU/CSU as a "catch aB party" (in Dtto Kirchheimer's phrase) that differed from other conservative parties in other European countries, for example the British Tories. Since 1983, national-conservatives have had other choices available, for example the Republikaner. This party was founded by two estranged members of the CSU (Leggewie, 1989) . The Republikaner has exploited the fact that CDU and CSU made promises to cut down on the number of naturalization for the second generation although the principle of ius sanguinis was not removed.
The new law gives a claim to naturalization to all those who have lived in Germany for fifteen years.
Moreover, young foreigners between 16 and 23 years of age can be naturalized if they have lived for eight years in Germany and attended six years of school in the Federal Republic.
foreigners (and "assimilate" those remaining). Immigration was a prime rallying issue for the populist Republikaner (Hennig et al. 1989: 32-39) . Although the CDU and CSU used the Ausländerproblem as a campaign issue before the emergence of the Republikaner, the rise of a right-wing competitor may have accelerated the symbolic uses of politics by the CDU and the CSU. Although the Republikaner did not succeed in entering the federa! parliament in 1987 and 1989, they managed to surpass the crucial five percent threshold in the 1989 European election and to enter the parliaments in several states (Länder). In the Landtag elections in BadenWürttemberg in 1991 , the CDU, along with tabloids such as Bild, strongly exploited xenophobie tendencies. However, the CDU experienced heavy losses while the Republikaner entered the Landtag. Election analysts coneluded that votes for right-wing parties came from voters who normally considered themselves followers of one of the big parties, the CDU/CSU (and Ihe SPD) (Roth 1990 ).
The SPD has been the most active party in incorporating labor mi grants in the political realm.
The SPD has organized most immigrant members of all parties, especially Turkish workers 2 Also, the Turkish Social Democrats cooperate with the SPD. Cooperation between Turkish organizations and German parties has flourished above all on the local level. Membership overlap between German parties and Turkish organizations also seems to be most widespread in social democratic organizations. In Berlin and in the Ruhr area, for example, many members of the Turkish Social Democrats are also members of the SPD. This cooperation has become eloser over time, because Turkish organizations have moved from an orientation to the country of origin to the politics of interest articulation in the country of settlement (Özcan 1989: 337-349 ).
However, the SPD did not succeed in seeuring voting rights for foreign residents with unlimited residence permits. In 1989, the Länder of Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein, all govemed by a social democratic majority or plurality, introduced laws to grant voting rights in local elections to foreigners that had resided in the Federal Republic for more than five years. The SPD's effort to establish local voting rights for non-citizen immigrants can be seen as an attempt to circumvent the issue of full citizenship by introducing voting rights through the "back door".
The CSU Land Bayern and the CDU Land Baden-Württemberg appealed to the Federal Constitutional Court. In order to prevent enfranchisement of labor migrants, the CDU used the argument that "the people" (das Volk) is constituted by citizens. Arguing that labor mi grants do not belong to the Volk, the CDU and CSU rejected proposals such as voting rights for settled migrants. The Court revoked the regulations of the SPD states. The central argument of the court's majority opinion was that "all state power departs from the people". Since the constitution (Basic Law) does not inelude foreigners in the Volk (ethnos), the judges deelared the Länder laws unconstitutional. The court argued that permanent foreign residents do not belong to "the people" (das Volk) and thus cannot be part of the electorate. Thus, the court returned the question to the political realm. The only political way to inelude permanent foreign residents into the electorate now is to open or increase opportunities for access to full 2 Estimates of aliens in the SPD range widely from 6,000 to 50,000. In the CDU aliens constitute . Correspondence with party headquarters).
citizenship. In essence, in rejecting the symbolic gesture of political citizenship far immigrants on the local level, the court urged the parties to return to a discussion of political membersh ip and naturalization (BVG E 83, 37, II, Nr. 3: 52) .
The CDU and CSU have benefited from the quasi-automatic political integration of expellees and refugees in the 1940 and 1950s and ethnic Germans since the late 1980s. The CDU/CSU federal government reaffirmed frequently that ethnic Germans are not immigrants but returnees. About a quarter of the West German population in 1989 was made up of refugees and expellees, including not only ethnic Germans but also citizens from the former GDR. About thirteen million came between end of World War Two and 1960. Closed borders ensured that the numbers of ethnic Germans who were actually able to emigrate remained quite smalI, on an average about 35.000 annually. But with the dissolution of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the numbers grew dramatically . Ethnic Germans have had an automatic right to enter the Federal Republic; very similar to the law of return in Israel. It has practically guaranteed access to German citizenship to all those refugees from Eastern Europe who can show so me connection to German ancestry. Because they were automatically enfranchised, ethnic Germans could be easily incorporated into political parties. The CDU/CSU had a special interest in incorporating large numbers of ethnic Germans. As election analyses have documented, the CDUICSU was able to catch most of the votes of ethnic Germans, expellees, and refugees since the late I 940s (Grebing 1989 ).
The CDU/CSU could justify the quasi-automatic admission of large numbers of ethnic Germans since the mid-1980s for various reasons. First of all, until 1989, the reception of ethnic Germans served as areminder of the continuing communist threat of the Federal Republic of Germany during the Cold War. Unles5 the SPD wanted to be denounced as a communist junior partner, the party had to consent unconditionally to the policies of invitation for ethnic Germans.
Second, as long as ethnic Germans suffered the fate of expellation, it could also be implicitly used as areminder of the "lost territories" in the Eas!. It was only after the successful implementation of the Ostpolitik initiated by chancellor Willy Brandt (SPD) that the CDU/CSU gradually started to soften its rhetoric on a Germany in the borders of 1937; and it was not until 1991 that CDU-chancellor Helmut Kohl signed a treaty with Poland recognizing the OderNeisse line as the border between Germany and Poland. Resistance to Ostpolitik in the CDU/CSU was also based on the fact that expellees and refugees had a powerful political lobby in the 19505. They experienced swift political incorporation. Politically, refugee organizations (Vertriebellellverbände) have acted as pressure graups within the CDU and CSU (Strothmann 1985: 209-218 ).
Third, the CDU and CSU have consistently pointed out that ethnic Germans are Germans as defined by the Basic Law. The category "ethnic German" is a legal construct of the Cold War (OltO 1990: 11-68) , based upon the citizenship law of 1913. According to the dominant argument ethnic Germans deserve special help because they are compatriots who had to suffer tremendously under the harsh effects of World War Two. They adhered to German language and culture in adverse circumstances. In short, the powerful principle of ethnic solidarity is paramount in justifying a special status for ethnic Germans. Since 1949, successive federal governments based their policies on the assumption that a11 ethnic Germans in the communist "Eastern bloc" have been subjected to "pressure of expe11ation." Immigration policies toward ethnic Germans are based on Article 116 of the Basic Law. According to this article, specified by the Federal Law on Expe11ees and Refugees (1953), Germans are a11 those who either hold German citizenship or who are German refugees and expe11ees who migrated to the German Reich (in the borders of 1937) until the end of World War Two. The Law on Expe11ees and Refugees has constituted a foil for numerous administrative orders that enlarged the group of ethnic Germans eligible for return to those citizens of East European count ries that were born after 1945 and could show some proof of German ancestry.
In sum, while political inclusion of labor migrants was contested, political incorporation of ethnic Germans has remained almost undisputed. Underlying the conflict over voting rights for labor mi grants and the unquestioned incorporation of ethnic Germans has been a debate over the definition of the ethno-cultural concept of citizenship. The CDU and CSU used the symbolic politics of "return" or "assimilation" of labor mi grants to circumvent questions of political citizenship. To justify inclusion of ethnic Germans, the CDU and CSU were able to draw upon German citizenship law. The SPD failed to advance the principle of "no taxation without representation" to political rights of settled migrants. Fina11y, the SPD only engaged in efforts to grant voting rights to settled aliens on the local level; a symbolic gest ure toward political citizenship of immigrants.
3, Symbolic Politics and Social Citizenship: "Welfare Chauvinism" and the Debate on Asylum
The ethno-cultural concept of citizenship and the symbolic politics of migration have reinforced each other. In particular, the political debate over asylum turned into a substitute debate on two issues, on rights and membership in the welfare state, and the regulation of migration without rea11y addressing immigration as an issue. The question raised by conservative and right-wing parties has been to what extent asylum seekers and certain groups of immigrants have a claim to social rights. Thus, the symbolic politics of asylum included the politics of "welfare chauvinism," the unwillingness of natives to share welfare state benefits with certain immigrant groups and asylum seekers that are perceived as "intruders." Above a11 the CDU, CSU, and the Republikaner focussed on political asylum as a meta-issue in the context of high unemployment rates among the native population and a1leged welfare fraud of asylum seekers. By contrast, the SPD unsuccessfu11y tried to separate the issues of migration and integration, on the one hand, and political asylum, on the other hand. In order to keep labor migration and asylum apalt, the SPD proposed explicit immigration laws.
Asylum seekers from developing countries, those gran ted asylum (Asylberechtigte), and certain groups of labor migrants could be framed to be "different" in crucial realms . These groups were perceived to be cultura11y different. Cultural difference was equated with a rejection of assimilation on the part of labor migrants and asylum seekers. Even before the number of asylum seekers drastically increased in the latter part of the 1980s, it was elevated to a key issue in electoral campaigns by the CDU and CSU in the late 1970s. At that time the pejorative term AsyLant entered political debates and since then has been applied to unwanted refugees, particularly those from developing countries.
The tactical use of the asylum question in inter-party conflicts is obvious in a phrase coined by CDU general secretary Volker Rühe: "Every additional AsyLant is a SPD-AsyLant" (Letter of Rühe to all CDU party branches in 1992, quoted in Thränhardt 1993). The Chrislian pani es introduced key terms into political debate, such as "over-foreignization," "flood of asylum seekers," "limits of endurance" and "the boat is fuH ." Former interior minister of Bavaria, Edmund Stoiber (CSU) even spoke of "racialized society" (durchrasste GeseLLschaft). The expression brought back memories of racial categories used during the Nazi regime. The head of the CDU parliamentary group in the Bundestag, Alfred Dregger, used the term "flooding" in parliamentary debates in the mid-1980s. "Flooding" in this context alluded to the Muslim threat to Europe in past centuries. The continuity of the juxtaposition of "Islamic" (oriental) versus "Christian" (occidental) culture in symbolic politics has been striking. For example, Turkish mi grants are thought to be unwilling to "assimilate" because they belong to Islam, a perception aided by the Islamic fundamentalism that gained influence in Turkish and North African immigrant communities in Europe during the 1970s. Alluding to the infiltration of Muslim values, Edmund Stoiber entitled one of his contributions to the daily newspaper Die WeLt: "And German judges turn over the leaves of the Qu'ran" (17 January 1989: 17). The important distinction here is European vs. Non-European; a distinction that has increased in importance due to the opening of borders in Eastern Europe and European integration within the European Community ("Fortress Europe").
Thus, the flow of asylum seekers was portrayed as one of "economic refugees" from developing countries (Armutsflüchtlinge) although most refugees actually were citizens of East European countries, such as the former Yugoslavia, fleeing war-tom and devastated regions (Table 3 ). In short, portraying migration and asylum as a cultural problem and equating non-European cultures with Islam allowed party politicians from the CDU, CSU and the Republikaner to conflate two groups of immigrants, labor mi grants from Turkey and asylum seekers from developing countries.
The language that accompanied German unification may have spurred the discourse of cultural difference. Among other things, it raised the issue of a collective identity as national identity. In the aftermath of German unification a rhetoric of national and ethnic identity, "we" vs. "them", has resurged and may have also affected the perception of labor migrants and asylum seekers as competitors for scarce goods such as jobs, housing and social services. Insofar as "welfare chauvinism" and violence against foreigners is concerned, we are left with a paradox that points toward the crucial role of labor migration and asylum as a meta-issue: In East Germany xenophobia exists without aliens. The unification of Germany connected two states with different histories of immigration after World War Two. The old Federal Republic had a much higher percentage of immigrants (8 percent) than the German Democratic Republic (I percent). Note: The figures do not measure substantial of out-migration during these years.
Source: See Table I .
Openly racist statements have been rare. This tendency has been visible above all among the Republikaner. They are more moderate in tone than their model, the French Front National and their German predecessors in the late 1960s, the Nationaldemokralische Partei Deutschlands NPD). The Republikaner have been so international as to borrow key terms such as "difference" from the French New Right, whose ideologists (e.g., Alain Benoist) are indebted to German writers such as Moeller van den Bruck and Carl Schmitt. The symbolic politics of difference does not rest upon ideologies of racial superiority that connect physical and mental characteristics. In the language of the New Right, "culture" and not "nature" serves as the key distinction between "civilizations". Behavior is thought to be based upon cultural differences. Although they are by no means identical, the late 20th century rhetoric of difference did easily fit in with ethno-cultural concepts of membership to justify exclusion of "intruders" from scarce goods.
The campaign rhetoric of the CDU, CSU, and the Republikaner suggested that asylum seekers and selected groups of labor migrants could be held responsible for causing politico-economic problems such as unemployment and cutbacks in social services. Frequently, politicians of the Republikaner, such as party chairman Franz Schänhuber, have criticized policies that integrate labor migrants into the German welfare state as attempts to deprive German citizens of deserved social provision and give it instead to unworthy welfare cheaters, among them "guestworkers" and asylum seekers. Asylum seekers offered an even easier target than settled labor migrants because the former group has not yet contributed to social insurance schemes, such as health, unemployment, and pension funds . Rather, asylum seekers receive non-contributory benefits, i.e., social assistance in kind (aid to subsistence).
In this way the symbolic politics of cultural difference has been inextricably connected to the politicization of welfare state politics. Both asylum seekers and ethnic Germans are newcomers who have not contributed to social insurance funds. For example, many laws in education and soc ial services are not dependent upon citizenship status. Foreigners who have unlimited residence permüs are not significantly disadvantaged vis-a-vis Germany in regard to social rights (cf. Heinelt 1993) . Based on the ethnic definition of citizenship, ethnic Germans are treated as if they had paid into these insurance schemes. Asylum seekers only have claims to social assistance benefits in kind. Social assistance benefits in kind for asylum seekers were further decreased in the early I 990s. One of the justifications used was that asylum seekers increasingly were abusing their rights by making multiple applications for social assistance. Thus, the abuse of welfare services insinuated the alleged "abuse" of the right to asylum and vlce versa.
These allegat ions strengthened the distinctions made between "economic" and "political" refugees, a widespread dichotomy in the political discourse of all Western welfare states. The conclusion drawn by CDU and CSU politicians was that only the latter group had a legitimate claim to asylum (cf. Bade 1992: 411-422). Low recognition rates of asylum seekers in the first instance (below ten percent) were taken as an indicator that most asylum seekers were "economic refugees" who came to compete with Germans for jobs, housing and social services. It is striking that recognition rates further decreased in the early 1980s and have since then dropped again the late I 980s, two periods in which the symbolic politics of asylum was prevalent (see Table I ) (cf. Münch 1992).
The rhetoric of deterrence toward asylum seekers and the we\coming of ethnic Germans accompanied the policy debate on asylum. The numbers of ethnic Germans were curbed by nonpublicized bureaucratic means. The increasing numbers of ethnic Germans seeking shelter in (he Federal Republic led to the new, more restrictive Law to Adapt Integration (1990) and the Ethnic German Reception Law (1991). According to the new laws and regulations, application for acceptance has to be made before leaving the home area in Eastern Europe so that the number of ethnic Germans entering the Federal Republic could be controlled. Thus, the Federal Office on Aussiedler Affairs has effectively implemented a de facto quota system.
The issue of political asylum, however, took center stage in inter-party confiicts in 1991-92, rivaled only by the follow-up problems of German unification. Until 1993, asylum seekers ca me to Gerrnany by asking for political asylum under Article 16 (Il, 2) of the constitution: "Every politically persecuted individual has a right to asyJum." Germany granted an individual claim to asylum for all those who are poJitically persecuted. Thus, the constitution obliged the Federal Republic to receive all those individuals who could show that they had been persecuted by state authorities on grounds of political belief, race, religion or membership in a certain social or ethnic groups in the country of origin. In short, German Basic Law gave individuals a claim to asyJum. By contrast, the Geneva Convention grounds asylum in the prerogative of sovereign states.
After a protracted debate, the major political parties reached a compromise on the asylum issue (in December 1992; changes went into effect in July 1993). It was agreed that Article 16 should be replaced by a new Article 16a. Among other restrictions, all asylum seekers now can be turned back at the border who enter the Federal Republic from neighboring "safe countries" (e.g. , Austria, the Czech Republic and Poland); who COOle from countries declared to be "free of persecution" (including Romania and Ghana, i.e., countries where many asylum seekers ca me from in recent years, see Table 3 ); and those asylum seekers whose application was already denied in other countries of the European Community. Effectively, the constitutional amen dOle nt implies that refugees who access Germany via land can be turned back without having the opportunity to enter the regular asylum process. One of the main attractions for politicians of all parties of supporting the changes of Article 16 was that the amendment promised immediate reductions in the number of asylum seekers. In Europe, most asylum seekers during the 1980s have COOle to the Federal Republic; only Switzerland and Sweden have received similar levels of refugees on aper capita basis.
While the conservative and populist parties heavily emphasized the fact that asylum seekers are culturally different, that they are economic competitors, and that many abuse the social assistance granted by the German welfare state, the SPD wavered on the asylum issue, experienced lengthy internal conflicts, and finally accepted the position of the CDU and CSU. Originally, however, SPD politicians defended the right to asylum as a humanitarian obligation of the Federal Republic to politically persecuted individuals. The SPD faced a dilemma. On the one hand, the SPD followed an integration ist strategy for those mi grants already in the country . On the other hand, the SPD was interested in controlling the flow of new immigrants to avoid undercutting wages and a potential downgrading of working and living conditions of native and settled mi grant workers. Pressure also came from local level SPD politicians. They were faced with mounting costs in housing and feeding asylum seekers. The symbolic politics of immigration successfully portrayed political asylum as unlimited "open border" policy with harmful consequences for the native population. Ouring the recruitment of "guestworkers" in the 1960s, unions and the SPO had partly diffused the perception of immigrants as economic competitors undercutting wages by insisting that they received the same rights and duties as German workers in the workplace. Moreover, the economic climate in the 1960s was still one of expansion and growth, in which many German workers may have experienced upward occupational mobility; this was perhaps even facilitated by a massive influx of "guestworkers" who came to occupy unskilled and, increasingly, semi-skilled blue-collar positions. In the 1980s, however, a growing number of SPD voters perceived "guestworkers" as a threat to job security, and asylum seekers as competitors for scarce housing and social benefits.
Since the absence of channels other than asylum for potential migrants had contributed to overburden the asylum process, the SPD tried to solve the dilemma in proposing an immigration law that controlled the admission of non-refugees. However, the continued immigration of ethnic Germans already constituted a substantial annual intake of newcomers and thus partly foreclosed options for establishing other immigration channels. In this situation, the SPD leadership chose to give priority to populist trends within its (potential) electorate. It tried to satisfy those groups that were considered potential voters of the CDU.
Multiculturalism: A Mirror Image of Ethno-Culturalism
One of the major alternative views to an ethnie understanding of membership has been the German version of rnulticulturalism. The debate on multiculturalism has surfaced in all West European and North Ameriean polities that have been faeed with the ineorporation of immigrants. Yet. it is no coincidence that the major alternative to an ethnic understanding of membership also carries the label "cultural." In Germany, the term did not refer to the political and economie realms of integration. Rather, it denoted the sphere of cultural assimilation and did not transcend cultural "differenee" or similarity as the main criterion of integration. Overall, proponents of multieulturalism primarily espoused a rather naive vision of non-conflictual ethnic relations (for a critique, see Cohn-BenditJSchmid 1992: 283-348) . Multiculturalism emphasized the cultural autonomy of ethnic groups over "assimilation." Intellectually, thi s position simply mirrored the ethno·cultural understanding of membership in a polity. It substituted a mono-cultural völkisch understanding with a similarly one-dimensional multieultural concept of membership. It is one-dimensional because it completely ignores the complex set of issues raised by polities in multiethnic polities. For example, there has been no debate on the extent of rights for minorities in the political and economic realms, e.g., in the workplace and the housing market. In other European countries, like France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden, the debate on multiculturalism has progressed beyond one-dimensional cultural eoncepts, due to policies that have reeognized the reality of migration and integration.
The term multiculturalism has also been used in a rather inconsistent way by all those who have rejected the "assimilation" vs. "return" rhetoric of the conservative-liberal federal government (cf. Leggewie 1991) . In Germany, the expression first circulated in church, union, and social democratic circles in the late 1970s. During the 1980s the term gradually spread within the community of experts on aliens issues, especially those who dealt with social and labor market policy, but also social workers, and teachers. Although the term "multieulturalism" has been debated within political parties, it has never become an issue in inter-party debate. Nonetheless, there were attempts to frame political issues by using the term. Those CDU politician s who aimed to appeal to voters of the "center," or who argued that metropolitan areas needed mi grants as workers in order to compensate for demographie deeline among the German population, were the main adherents of multiculturalism within the CDU (e.g., the former general secretary
Heiner Geißler and the mayor of Stuttgart, Manfred Rommel).
Also, groups within the SPD and the Green Party were proponents of multiculturalism. For example, the Greens did not only reject an ethno-cultural understanding of citizenship (Die Grünen 1990: 72-84) . They have consistently brought up the issue of political citizenship and voting rights for foreigners. Their bill of settlement went further than SPD proposals. For example. the party has suggested a claim to naturalization after five years of residence in Germany ( Die Grünen 1990: 72-84) . Moreover, sections within the Green Party took the high moral ground of seeing Germany as a haven for the world's refugees in an international state system with increasingly restrictive immigration and asy1um laws. They even went beyond the constitutionally guaranteed right to asylum. This position could be considered more a matter of political confession than an actual policy proposal. The underlying argument was that the concept of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, social group or political opinion no longer captured the needs of today's refugees in all cases. Therefore, Article 16 should be expanded to include all those who f1ed because of gender, sexual orientation, (civii) war, the death penalty, and other threats to life and political convictions. The normative justification vindicated a principled commitment to address the causes of f1ight and asylum on agiobai scale. The specific arguments made pertain to the German hi storical legacy and a general responsibility towards the peoples of the developing countries. Yet, this position was plagued by a rather straightforward "open border" policy. Possible political and economic consequences of a rigorous "open border" policy were not addressed. Intra-party discourse in the Green Party has only slowly moved toward a recognition of basic issues of migration control, e.g., infrastructural conditions for the reception of large numbers of mi grants or asylum seekers.
5.
Conclusion: Towards a Recognition of Immigration
The successful use of symbolic politics in upholding the fiction of a non-immigration country had various consequences for the po1itical discourse on the politics of migration and integration. First, migration regulation did not develop as a legitimate policy objective. Instead, discussions focussed on political asylum. Most of the arguments used by political parties in the debate over the constitutional issue of asylum --uneasily seitling between the poles of "not a country of immigration" and "open borders" --did not move the public discussion to questions that form the comerstones of any migration policy, i.e . admission and selection of immigrants. Immigration is not a legitimate policy objective that could be operationalized in laws and regu lations of migration . lndeed, the opening of the eastern borders has also spurred the contract worker system of Werkvertragsarbeitnehmer. Since the mid-1980s labor mi grants have been recruited from Eastem European countries. The "guestworkers" of the 1960s and 1970s have thus been followed by contract laborers from Eastem Europe. About 100,000 contract laborers a month were employed in late 1992 (ANBA 1992: 718) . Unlike the former "guestworkers" these new contract workers are not equal to Germans regarding social and labor law. They are employed by subcontractors in Eastern European sending countries. Moreover, strict rotational rules are designed to avoid integration of these labor migrants into German society.
Second, the symbolic uses of politics helped to construct migration as a meta-issue: Not recognizing the reality of immigration, it could be successfully used as a factor explaining the deleterious effects of economic crisis and policy failures. Ultimately, immigration as a metaissue means that the reference to migration as a root cause of policy failures, socio-economic and political problems has gained currency to such an extent that it can be used to legitimize changes in the constitution without having to draw upon and present substantive policy solutions.
Third, it is no coincidence that alternative concepts to the prevailing public German discourse of ethno-culturalism, i.e., various versions of multiculturalism, have simply mirrored the ethno· cultural understanding of membership in the German polity by advocating a similarly onedimensional positive image of cultural autonomy in multiethnic states and exc1uding issues of social and political citizenship. Yet, as the discussion on voting rights and asylum showed, the ethno-cultural concept has not gone unchallenged. The position taken by the advocates of voting rights for immigrants corresponds to intellectual positions of an "open republic" or an "unfinished republic" that grounds citizenship in a republican tradition (Hoffmann 1990; Oberndörfer 1989) . Republican in this context means that membership in a polity is not a derivative of culture and heritage. lnstead, active participation in political and economic Iife form the basis of membership and citizenship rights and duties.
To ground citizenship rights and membership in a polity in political participation and not in cultural assimilation could be a promising way to chaJlenge the dominant ethno-cultural concept of membership and its use in symbolic politics. To the extent that the symbolic uses of politics have framed immigration as a meta-issue, it will prove exceedingly difficult to introduce politically viable alternative agendas. An ethno-cultural resurgence in all Western welfare states since the laIe 1 970s suggests that immigration is a meta-issue common to aJl developed welfare states. Yet, to root membership in political participation would probably weaken the dominance of ethno-cultural concepts in German political discourse. An important implication could be that the very concept of membership would be less likely to reinforce the use of immigration as a meta-issue. In other words, the political discourse could move from the now dominant quest ion of "How to define a foreigner?" to "How to define a citizen?"
